




The midweight method to measure attitudes towards risk and ambiguity








Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van de Kuilen, G., & Wakker, P. P. (2011). The midweight method to measure attitudes towards risk and
ambiguity. Management Science, 57(3), 582-598. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1282
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 57, No. 3, March 2011, pp. 582–598




The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes
Toward Risk and Ambiguity
Gijs van de Kuilen
Department of Economics, Tilburg University, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, g.v.d.kuilen@uvt.nl
Peter P. Wakker
Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, wakker@ese.eur.nl
This paper introduces a parameter-free method for measuring the weighting functions of prospect theory andrank-dependent utility. These weighting functions capture risk attitudes, subjective beliefs, and ambiguity
attitudes. Our method, called the midweight method, is based on a convenient way to obtain midpoints in
the weighting function scale. It can be used both for risk (known probabilities) and for uncertainty (unknown
probabilities). The resulting integrated treatment of risk and uncertainty is particularly useful for measuring
ambiguity, i.e., the difference between uncertainty and risk. Compared to existing methods to measure weighting
functions and attitudes toward uncertainty and ambiguity, our method is more efficient and can accommodate
violations of expected utility under risk. An experiment demonstrates the tractability of our method, yielding
plausible results such as ambiguity aversion for moderate and high likelihoods but ambiguity seeking for low
likelihoods, as predicted by Ellsberg.
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1. Introduction
Decision under risk relates to cases where known sta-
tistical probabilities are available for random events.
Since Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921), it has been
understood that such probabilities are often not avail-
able. Savage (1954) proposed expected utility with
subjective instead of objective probabilities for such
cases. Then prospects are evaluated by their (sub-
jective) probability weighted average utility. How-
ever, Allais (1953) showed that people often do not
weight probabilities linearly, which violates expected
utility. Ellsberg (1961) put forward a more fundamen-
tal problem: often people cannot assign probabilities,
not even subjective ones, to random events (ambi-
guity). For a long time, researchers did not know
how to model decision making under ambiguity. Only
since Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
and Schmeidler (1989) have models become available
that can handle ambiguity. Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1992) prospect theory added descriptive improve-
ments to these models.
Virtually all nonexpected utility models use weight-
ing functions that generalize probabilities by relaxing
the additivity requirement. That is, the weight of the
union of two disjoint events need not be the sum of
their separate weights. Obviously, the increased flex-
ibility comes at a price: eliciting nonadditive weight-
ing functions requires more work. Whereas for risk
there have been many papers measuring weight-
ing functions, for ambiguity there have been only
a few (§8). This paper introduces a new method,
the midweight method, to measure weighting func-
tions, both for risk and for ambiguity. This method
is more efficient than previous measurement meth-
ods because it minimizes the need to measure utility
and focuses on the weighting function. Our method
is nonparametric in the sense that it does not make
any prior assumption about the form of utility or
weighting functions. Hence, any empirical shape can
be detected. Especially for ambiguity, which is hard
to model but prevails in practice (Greenspan 2004),
it is desirable that tractable measurement methods
become available.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly
presents prospect theory. Section 3 introduces the
midweight method, first for risk, then for uncertainty.
An empirical measurement of the weighting function
for risk is in §4. Section 5 applies the midweight
method to measure general uncertainty attitudes, and
§6 applies the method to measure ambiguity atti-
tudes based on the Abdellaoui et al. (2011) source
method. Predictions derived from our measurements
are tested in §7. Discussions and conclusions are in
§§8–10. Throughout this paper, we first present results
for risk and then extend them to uncertainty. In this
way, we make this paper accessible to readers unfa-
miliar with the relatively new models of uncertainty
and ambiguity. Those readers interested only in our
method for risk can skip all texts on ambiguity with-
out loss of continuity.
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2. Prospect Theory for
Risk and for Uncertainty
Outcomes are monetary, with + the outcome set. For
simplicity, we do not consider losses (negative out-
comes). Our method can be applied to losses exactly
as it will be to gains. Because the midweight method
requires no more than three distinct outcomes, we
focus on this case in this theoretical exposition. For
discussions and motivations of the following theories,
see Wakker (2010).
We first consider decision under risk. We use
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory,
which coincides with Quiggin’s (1981) rank-depen-
dent utility because we only consider gains. It is
an improved version of Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) original prospect theory because it corrects
a theoretical problem of probability weighting and
allows more than two nonzero outcomes. A prospect
(p1x1 p2x2 p3x3) yields xj with probability pj , j =
123. The pj ’s are nonnegative and sum to 1. The




Here U denotes utility, which is continuous and
strictly increasing. The (probability) weighting function
w maps 01 to 01 and is strictly increasing and
continuous, with w0= 0 and w1= 1. In what fol-
lows, xpy denotes the two-outcome prospect yield-
ing x with probability p and y with probability 1− p.
We now turn to decision under uncertainty. The
major improvement of Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1992) prospect theory relative to the 1979 version
was that the new theory could handle not only risk
but also the more general and more important con-
text of uncertainty (which includes ambiguity). We
will use this extension in our study, where it coin-
cides with Gilboa’s (1987) and Schmeidler’s (1989)
rank-dependent utility (also called Choquet expected
utility) because no losses are involved. Under uncer-
tainty, prospects assign outcomes to uncertain events
of which the probabilities need not be known. In
our experiment, the uncertain events concerned the
average temperature in the Dutch city of Eindhoven
11 days ahead. E1x1E2x2E3x3 denotes the prospect
yielding xj if Ej obtains, where the Ej ’s denote
three temperature intervals, or unions of tempera-
ture intervals. It is always understood that the Ej ’s
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Our subjects
were not provided with the historical frequencies of
these events. Statistics of the past, even if available,
would not have eliminated all ambiguity because of
changed circumstances today, due to global warming,
for example. We denote by xEy the prospect yielding x
under event E and y otherwise.
We use utility U as before, but instead of the
weighting function w for probabilities, we use a func-
tion W defined on events. For reasons explained later,
W is called an event weighting function, or weighting
function for short. W assigns weight 0 to the vacu-
ous event and weight 1 to the universal event, and
A⊃ B implies WA ≥WB. W shares these proper-
ties with probability measures. However, WA∪B =
WA+WB may hold for disjoint events A, B, vio-
lating additivity, and this is where W generalizes
probability measures. A prospect E1x1E2x2E3x3 is
evaluated by




Risk can be considered to be the special case of
uncertainty where probabilities pj are given for the
events Ej , and WEj = wpj. So as to clarify this
point, we use the same terms for risk and uncertainty
whenever no confusion arises.
Convexity of w can be defined as
wa+ b−wb≤wa+ b+ i−wb+ i
for all nonnegative a b and i
 (3)
It is naturally extended to uncertainty, with W
convex if
WA∪B−WB≤WA∪B ∪ I−WB ∪ I
for all disjoint events A B and I 
 (4)
Concavity is defined by reversing the inequality signs.
Our terminology is consistent in the following sense:
If W is a transform wP of a probability measure P ,
then under some richness assumptions, convexity
(concavity) of W is equivalent to convexity (concav-
ity) of w (Wakker 2010, Table 10.9.1). In the domain
investigated in our study, we test the often found
inverse-S shape of weighting functions by testing con-
cavity for unlikely events and convexity for events of
moderate and high likelihood.
Assuming zero decision weight (and probability)
for single temperature values, it is immaterial how
we take openness and closedness of intervals. For
convenience, we usually take intervals left-closed and
right-open.
3. The Midweight Method Defined
The midweight method, which measures midpoints
in the weighting scale, starts by measuring a utility
midpoint. To this end we elicit
x2py∼x1pY and x1py∼x0pY for risk and
x2Ey∼x1EY and x1Ey∼x0EY for uncertainty
(5)
with x2 > x1 > x0 > Y > y (as in Wakker and Den-
effe’s 1996 tradeoff method). Then, with 0< =wp
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Figure 1 Distributing d’s Weight Evenly over the Upper and
Lower Branch












Ux2−Ux1 = 1−UY −Uy
= Ux1−Ux0 which implies
Ux2−Ux1=Ux1−Ux0
 (6)
That is, x1 is the utility midpoint of x2 and x0. These
outcomes will be used throughout what follows, and
from here on the preference domain will be restricted
to prospects that use only these three outcomes (called
the probability triangle of x0, x1, and x2 for risk).
We first present the midweight method for risk. For
any probability a and larger probability d+ a we find
their w-midpoint probability g + a, with 0 < g < d.
We start from the left prospect L= ax2dx1 cx0 in
Figure 1, with x0, x1, x2 as in Equations (5) and (6)
for risk. Here d, the probability mass of x1 in the
left prospect, is divided (this is what d refers to)
over the other outcomes to yield the equivalent right
prospect R. g is moved to the high outcome x2, and
the remainder b = d − g is moved to the low out-
come x0.
Because the proof of the following theorem is
instructive, it is given in the main text.





























Decision weights π and probabilities for prospect L
d c
Decision weights π and probabilities for prospect R 
Probability of x0
∗ Decision weight moved from Ux1 to Ux2= decision weight moved from Ux1 to Ux0; g: probability moved from x1 to x2; b: probability moved from
x1 to x0.
Theorem 1. The indifference in Figure 1 implies that
wg+ a= wa+wd+ a
2
whenever Ux2−Ux1=Ux1−Ux0 > 0.
Proof. Figure 2 depicts the decision weights to be
derived. The move of g probability mass from out-
come x1 up to outcome x2 increases the prospect the-
ory value by  12 ·Ux2−Ux1, where  12 is the extra
decision weight for the upper branch, wg+ a−wa
(the lower ∗ in Figure 2). The move of b probability
mass from outcome x1 down to outcome x0 decreases
the prospect theory value by  10 · Ux1 − Ux0,
where  10 is the extra decision weight for the lower
branch, i.e., 1−wg+a− 1−wd+a=wd+a−
wg+a (the upper ∗ in Figure 2). Dropping the equal
utility differences, wg+a−wa=wd+a−wg+a
must hold so as to preserve indifference. The theorem
follows. 
Our approach is general in the sense that the
weight midpoint between any two probabilities can
be measured directly. The only richness of outcomes
needed is that a utility midpoint exists for at least
one pair of outcomes. With a method available to
measure midpoints of the weighting function, we can
measure the weighting function to any desired degree
of precision. For example, we can start with p= 0 and
q = 1 to find w−11/2, i.e., the probability correspond-
ing to weight 1/2. Then we use p= 0 and q =w−11/2
to find w−11/4, and so on.
The midweight method can be applied to uncer-
tainty in a way very analogous to risk, as is explained
next. For any event A and a larger event D ∪ A
van de Kuilen and Wakker: The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes Toward Risk and Ambiguity
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a W -midpoint event G ∪ A (G ⊂ D) can be deter-
mined by eliciting indifference between the prospects
Ax2Dx1Cx0 and x2G∪Ax0 as in Figure 3.
Theorem 2. The indifference in Figure 3 implies that
WG∪A= WA+WD∪A
2
whenever Ux2−Ux1=Ux1−Ux0 > 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for risk, with
the value increase WG∪A−WAUx2−Ux1
of the right prospect equal to its value decrease
WD ∪A−WG∪AUx1−Ux0, implying the
theorem. 
A midpoint event G ∪A as just constructed exists
for all events A and D ∪A if the event space is suf-
ficiently rich (such as a continuum), as, for instance,
in Gilboa’s (1987) preference foundation of rank-
dependent utility.
4. Direct Measurement of the
Weighting Function for Risk
This section describes an experiment measuring the
weighting function for risk.
Subjects. N = 78 undergraduate students from a
wide range of disciplines were recruited at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. They were self-selected from
a mailing list of about 400 people. Fourteen subjects
were excluded from the analysis because they gave
erratic or heuristic answers such as always choosing
the left prospect or always choosing the right prospect
(details are in Online Appendix F, provided in the
e-companion1). The practice choices also served to
detect such erratic and heuristic answers. These sub-
jects apparently did not understand the choices or
did not think about them seriously. In future stud-
ies, individual interviews could be used to reduce
such misunderstandings. The following analysis is
based on the remaining 64 subjects (26 female; median
age 21). Including the excluded subjects would not
have altered the results presented hereafter.
1 An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the on-
line version that can be found at http://mansci.journal.informs.org/.
Procedure. Subjects were seated in front of personal
computers in seven different sessions with approxi-
mately 11 subjects per session. After receiving exper-
imental instructions (see Appendix B), subjects were
given the experimental questions. Subjects were asked
two practice choice questions to familiarize them with
the experimental procedure.
Stimuli: General. In each question subjects chose
between a prospect L (left) and a prospect R (right).
Both prospects yielded prizes depending on the out-
come of a roll with two 10-sided dice, each deter-
mining one digit of a random number below 100.
Prospects were framed as in Figure 4. Subjects indi-
cated their choice by clicking on the appropriate but-
ton. They were encouraged to answer at their own
pace. The position of each prospect was counterbal-
anced among subjects.
Measuring Utility.We set x0 = 60 and obtained val-








(The values that were elicited are shown in bold.)
Then under prospect theory, x1 is the utility mid-
point of x0 and x2 (Equation (6)). Because all fur-
ther measurements in the experiment depended on
the values x1 and x2, these values were elicited
twice, and the average of the two elicitations was
used as input in the rest of the experiment so as
to reduce noise. Throughout this paper, indifferences
are obtained using a bisection choice method. Bisec-
tion methods, although time consuming, give more
consistent results than direct matching (Bardsley and
Moffat 2009, Bostic et al. 1990, Noussair et al. 2004).
Our method is similar to Abdellaoui’s (2000), with
five iteration steps, and is explained in detail in
Appendix A.
Measuring Probability Weighting for Risk. Using
the midweight method, we elicited five probabilities:
w−1(1/8), w−1(2/8), w−1(4/8), w−1(6/8), and w−1(7/8).
We framed the prospects as in Figure 4. All left
prospects used in the experiment are special cases of
prospect L in Figure 1 with at least one probability 0,
so that at most two branches remain.
The midweight method concerns indifference
between prospect L = ax2dx1 cx0 and prospect
R= x2g+ax0 which, as shown in §3, implies that prob-
ability g + a is the weight midpoint between proba-
bility a and probability d+ a. For example, to obtain
w−1(4/8), the weight midpoint between 0 and 1, we
take a = 0, c = 0, and d = 1 in Figure 1, yielding the
left panel of Figure 5. Now prospect L is the degen-
erate prospect yielding x1 with certainty. Figure 5
lists the indifferences elicited to obtain the proba-
bilities w−1(1/8), w−1(2/8), w−1(4/8), w−1(6/8), and
w−1(7/8). In general, to find the g’s to generate the
van de Kuilen and Wakker: The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes Toward Risk and Ambiguity
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Figure 4 Framing of the Prospect Pairs
Prospect L Prospect R
Roll Probability Prize Roll Probability Prize
1 to p p% Exi−1 1 to p p% Exi
p+ 1 to 100 100− p% EY p+ 1 to 100 100− p% Ey
required indifferences, we used a bisection method as
in the outcome part of the experiment, explained in
Appendix A. To test for order effects, for one group
we elicited w−1(2/8) and w−1(1/8) before w−1(6/8)
and w−1(7/8), and for the other group we did it the
other way around.
Motivating Subjects. We used a variation of the
random incentive system, the almost exclusively used
real incentive system for individual choice experi-
ments today. For each of the seven sessions, there
were as many envelopes as subjects, with one enve-
lope containing a blue card and all others contain-
ing a white card. Each subject was asked to choose
an envelope. Only the subject who had the blue card
could play for real. For this subject, one choice ques-
tion was again selected randomly and the chosen
prospect in that choice question was played out for
real, with the subject paid according to the prospect
chosen and the outcome that resulted from playing
out this prospect. All other subjects in a particular ses-
sion, who had chosen a white card, received a fixed
payment of E5. The possible monetary outcomes of the
prospects used during the experiment ranged from
E30 to approximately E250. All payments were done
privately, immediately at the end of the experiment.
The average payment under real play was E77.57, so
that the total reward per subject was approximately
E11.60, and it took subjects about 20 minutes to com-
plete the experiment. Armantier (2006) and Harrison
et al. (2007, footnote 16) compared this version of











































the random incentive system, where only some sub-
jects are paid for real, to the more popular rewarding
scheme where all subjects are paid for real, and found
no difference. These papers considered static choice,
as in our paper. Baltussen et al. (2010) did find a dif-
ference for dynamic decision making.
Further Stimuli. Our questions were chained. It
is well known that chaining can give incentives for
not truthfully answering questions (Harrison 1986).
To check whether subjects had been aware of this pos-
sibility, we asked two strategy-check questions: “Was
there any special reason for you to specially choose
left more often, or specially choose right more often?”
and “Can you state briefly which method you used to
determine your choice?” These questions were asked
in a questionnaire at the end of the experiment, with
further questions about age, field of study, and gen-
der. Further discussion is in §9.
Results: Utility. The first measurement of outcome
x1(x2) did not differ significantly from its second
measurement (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, z= 1
23,
p= 0
2 and z = −1
48, p = 0
14). We therefore take
averages of the two measurements in the following
analyses. We had also used those averages for the
stimuli in the experiment that used x1 and x2 as
inputs.
The median values of x1 and x2 are 92.25 and 123,
respectively, which together with x0 = 60 suggests lin-
ear utility. The deviation from linearity is not signif-
icant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 0
89, p = 0
38),
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Table 1 Counts of w−1p− p > 0 and w−1p− p < 0
w−1p− p >0 <0
p= 1/8 49∗∗ 15
p= 2/8 48∗∗ 16
p= 4/8 44∗∗ 20
p= 6/8 44∗∗ 18
p= 7/8 41 23
∗∗ Denotes significance at the 1% level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-
rank test.
in agreement with the common hypothesis that util-
ity is approximately linear for moderate amounts of
money (Rabin 2000). At the individual level, 26 (32)
out of 64 subjects exhibited a concave (convex) utility
function. This result is robust for gender and field of
study.
Results: Probability Weighting. Because there was
no order effect for decision weights, we pooled
the data. Figure 6 displays the median weighting
function. Means were similar to medians, and stan-
dard deviations were approximately 0.2. The median
weighting function is convex (pessimistic).
Table 1 confirms that subjects did not process prob-
abilities linearly, but mostly underweighted them. The
probabilities w−1 all differ significantly from their
corresponding weights  except for w−17/8.
We used Bleichrodt and Pinto’s (2000) classification
system of individual weighting functions of subjects.
In short, we considered slope differences, i.e., changes
in the average slope of the probability weighting
function between two adjacent probability intervals.
A weighting function was classified as exhibiting
lower (upper) subadditivity if the slope difference on
the first (last) two intervals of the weighting function
was negative (positive), suggesting concavity (con-
vexity) there. A subject was classified as inverse-S in



















Prelec’s function (Equation (8))
with =1.454, =1.578
case of both lower and upper subadditivity, as con-
cave if three slope differences were negative and the
subject did not exhibit upper subadditivity, and as
convex if three slope differences were positive and
the subject did not exhibit lower subadditivity. Based
on this classification, 20.13% of the weighting func-
tions exhibited lower subadditivity and 43.75% exhib-
ited upper subadditivity. Their intersection, inverse-S,
occurred for 10.49% of the subjects. 23.44% of the
weighting functions were concave, 53.13% were con-
vex, 0% was linear, and 12.49% remained unclassified.
All the above analyses were nonparametric. We
also estimated Prelec’s (1998) two-parameter com-
pound invariance weighting function for every sub-
ject by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. This
weighting function is given by
wp= e−)− ln p* (8)
where * captures likelihood insensitivity (i.e., the
degree to which behavior is sensitive toward changes
in likelihood), and ) (which is the power) captures the
degree of optimism or pessimism. The median values
of * and ) were 1.145 and 1.578, whereas the values
of * and ) based on median data were *= 1
054 and
)= 1
763. The former weighting function is depicted
in Figure 6 and, obviously, accommodates the pre-
vailing convexity. Further results, including individ-
ual results, are in the online appendix, provided in
the e-companion.
Results: Strategy-Check Questions. In the strategy-
check questions, none of the subjects revealed aware-
ness of the chained nature of the questions, or an
attempt to strategically exploit this chaining. Twenty-
five subjects indicated a combination of (expected or
maximal) value and safety, five maximized expected
value, and four maximized highest value. Various
other reasons were given for the choices made.
5. Direct Measurement of the
Weighting Function for Uncertainty
This section describes an experiment measuring the
weighting function for uncertainty.
Subjects. N = 44 undergraduate economics stu-
dents were recruited at Tilburg University by an
online recruitment system. The experiment was held
on September 11, 2008. Three subjects were excluded
from the data set because they gave erratic answers,
such as always preferring the left prospect or always
preferring the right one (details are as with risk;
see Online Appendix F). The following analysis is
based on the remaining 41 subjects (21 female; median
age 20). Including the three excluded subjects would
not have altered the results presented hereafter.
Procedure. Subjects were seated in front of per-
sonal computers in four different sessions with about
11 subjects per session. They were asked two practice
van de Kuilen and Wakker: The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes Toward Risk and Ambiguity
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choice questions to familiarize them with the exper-
imental procedure. In each question, they chose
between a prospect L (left) and R (right) by clicking
on the corresponding button. They were encouraged
to answer the questions at their own pace.
Stimuli. Prospects yielded prizes depending on the
mean temperature (C) in Eindhoven 11 days after the
experiment, as measured by the Royal Dutch Meteo-
rological Institute (KNMI). Prospects were framed in
a way similar to the risk experiment.
Measuring Utility. As for risk (Equation (7)), we set
x0 = 60 and then elicited indifferences:
x1E30∼ 60E40 and x2E30∼ x1E40 (9)
but now we used event E of mean temperature
exceeding 15.7C rather than a probability of 0.25.
Again, x1 and x2 were elicited twice, their average was
taken, and x1 is the U midpoint of x0 and x2.
We then measured the W value of events t→
(temperature exceeding t). The temperatures mea-




See Figure 7. Obviously, ti decreases in i. Tij denotes
ti tj  for ti < tj i > j; see Figure 8. We write t0 =
 and t8 =−. This notation is natural. For exam-
ple, Wt0→= 0/8= 0 and Wt8→=8/8=1, as in
Equation (10). Ti0 = ti→. A bisection choice method





was again used to obtain indifferences between
prospects. We used at most five iteration steps, stop-
ping if the interval obtained was not broader than half
a degree, and took its midpoint as the elicited indif-
ference temperature ti. Thus, a precision of a quarter
degree results.
Subjects were informed that the average tempera-
ture in Eindhoven during the past 50 years had never
been below 8.8C or above 20.4C. They were told that
the average temperature could be assumed to be in
[7.2C, 22C), and this interval was the starting indif-
ference interval containing t4.
Motivating Subjects. This was done the same way
as under risk, with a random incentive system, white
and blue cards, and a show-up fee of E7.50. For
each group, the subject who selected the blue card
was invited to collect the possible prize at any day
after the uncertainty about the temperature had been
resolved.
Results: Utility. Again, the first measurement of
outcome x1x2 did not differ significantly from the






values of x1 and x2 were 77.25 and 91.50, respectively,
which, together with x0 = 60, suggests linear util-
ity on average (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1
48,
p= 0
14). Because the subjective likelihoods and sub-
jective weightings may be different here than under
risk, the values x1 and x2 can be expected to be dif-
ferent too; they were lower.2 However, the absolute
2 The historical probability of event E, based on data from the past
50 years, was 0.25, which is the same probability as used under
risk. The subjects were not informed about such historical data. The
median subjective probability of E (explained later) was 0.38. The
difference in (subjective) probabilities and weights does not affect
the validity of our experiment.
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size of the x’s (or of their differences) is immaterial
because only their equal spacedness in utility mat-
ters for our analysis. At the individual level, 13 (21)
out of 41 subjects exhibited a concave (convex) util-
ity function. This result is robust for gender and field
of study.
Results: W. The median ti values are t1 = 19
75,
t2 = 16
85, t4 = 13
00, t6 = 10
96, and t7 = 9
70, with
means very similar and standard deviations approx-
imately 2.5. Figure 9 depicts the graph assigning the
median Wt→ to every temperature t.
Direct Tests of Properties of W. If we obtain
enough quantitative measurements of the weighting
function, then we can verify its properties such as
additivity, convexity, and concavity. It is also possible
to test such properties directly from qualitative prefer-
ences. Table 2 presents preferences that we observed
through direct choices in the experiment (not allowing
for indifferences) and the way in which they corrob-
orate various properties of W . (We added the second
row, regarding “additive,” in the table for clarity.) For
example, with U0= 0, the value of 75T100 in the mid-
dle column is WT10U75, with W applied to the
unlikely event T10. The value of 0T87 75 in the right
column is WT70U75, with W applied to the likely
event T70.
Proof for Table 2. We derive results for convexity
of W . The other results are similar.
75T210  75T100⇒WT21 ≤WT10 = 1/8 =WT20−
WT10. Then T21 adds less weight to the vacuous
event (which has weight zero) than to event T10, to
which it adds weight 1/8 because it augments the
weight WT10 = 1/8 to WT20 = 2/8 there. This cor-
roborates convexity of W .
0T7675  0T87 75⇒ WT87 ∪ T60 ≤ WT70 shows that
T87 adds less than 1/8 weight to T60, which is what
it adds to its complement T70. Again, the marginal W
contribution of T87 to the larger T70 is larger than it is
to the smaller T60, corroborating convexity of W . 
Table 2 Observed Qualitative Preferences
W W concerns unlikely events W concerns likely events
Additive 75T10 0∼ 75T21 0 0T87 75∼ 0T76 75
Convex 75T10 0 75T21 0 (34%) 0T87 75 0T76 75 (44%)
Concave 75T10 0 75T21 0 (66%)∗ 0T87 75 0T76 75 (56%)
Inverse-S 75T10 0 75T21 0 (66%)∗ 0T87 75 0T76 75 (44%)
∗ p < 005 (a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test with H0: percentage
is 50%).
For unlikely events we find significantly more con-
cavity than convexity, rejecting additivity and agree-
ing with inverse-S. For likely events the deviations
from additivity were not significant.
Discussion. The values Wt→ suffice to evaluate
all prospects with outcomes increasing in temper-
ature.3 To evaluate other prospects, more measure-
ments of W are needed. For example, for prospects
with outcomes decreasing in temperature, we need to
measure values W← t. In the absence of additivity,
W← t cannot be inferred fromWt→ as just mea-
sured because these two values need not sum to 1.
In general, to evaluate a prospect f , we have to mea-
sure W at all events .t f t≥ */ for all outcomes * of
the prospect. This added complexity is, as always, the
price we pay for working with a more general model.
In general, the family of nonadditive measures is
large, and often special subfamilies are considered so
as to increase tractability (Grabisch et al. 2008). In the
next section, we consider a special subfamily, put for-
ward by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). Based on Tversky
and Fox’s (1995) ideas, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) dis-
tinguished between different sources of uncertainty.
A source (of uncertainty) is a group of events that
are generated by the same random mechanism. In
our study, the two rolls of the 10-sided die, used
to generate risk, constitute one source of uncertainty.
The temperature in Eindhoven is another source of
uncertainty. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) considered cases
where within each source (generic notation So) there
exist subjective probabilities PSo, and for each source
the weighting function W is a transform wSoPSo) of
those subjective probabilities. The transformation wSo
depends on the source and is called a source function.
As explained by Abdellaoui et al. (2011), the source
function captures all deviations from expected utility,
comprising both risk attitudes beyond utility curva-
ture and deviations from risk due to ambiguity. Prob-
abilistic sophistication within one source characterizes
a uniform degree of ambiguity (Wakker 2008) for that
source, not absence of ambiguity as has sometimes
been claimed (Epstein and Zhang 2001). In the next
3 This can be inferred from Equation (2). It holds for general
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section, we analyze the uncertain source concerning
the temperature in Eindhoven using the Abdellaoui
et al. (2011) method.
6. Using Subjective Probabilities to
Measure Ambiguity
This section shows how the midweight method can
simplify the measurement of the Abdellaoui et al.
(2011) source functions. We assume that probabilis-
tic sophistication holds with a subjective probability
measure P (depending on the subject) for the tem-
perature in Eindhoven. For each temperature event E,
WE=wtPE with wt the Eindhoven temperature
source function.
The measurement of W can now be simplified
considerably. Thus this section, in combination with
the previous one, provides a complete measurement
of W . First, we measure the subjective probability
measure P , something that also has to be done under
Bayesian expected utility. Next,W is plotted as a func-
tion of P for the events as considered in the previ-
ous section, yielding the source function wt . Then, the
whole weighting function W = wtP is determined,
also for events not considered in the previous section.
Now all prospects can be evaluated, including those
whose outcomes do not increase in temperature. With
W and wt entirely determined, we can, obviously, also
investigate all their properties. For example, expected
utility holds if and only if W equals P ; i.e., if and only
if the source function wt is linear.
To measure P note that with x > 0 and A and B tem-
perature events, we have the following implication:
xA0∼ xB0 ⇒ wtPAUx=wtPBUx
⇒ PA= PB
 (11)






































































Events A and B as in Equation (11) are called equally
likely. Observations of equal likelihood can be used to
measure P (Savage 1954). More specifically, we will
use the Abdellaoui et al. (2011) method for eliciting
subjective probabilities.
Stimuli. In the order of elicitation, we measured
temperatures s4, s6, s2, s7, and s1, such that the indif-
ferences in Figure 10 hold, with the notation s0 =,
s8 =−, and Sij = si sj  for i > j . Then Psi→= i/8
for all i, so that the notation is similar to that for the
ti’s in preceding sections. See Figure 11. The measure-
ment procedure of indifference was the same as in §4.
Under expected utility, sj = tj for all j .
Results: Subjective Probabilities. Figure 12 dis-
plays the subjective probability distribution resulting
from the median si’s that we observed, together
with the historical probability distribution from the
past 50 years regarding the mean temperature on
September 22. Our subjects generally considered high
temperatures more likely than they were in the
past, possibly because of global warming (see Online
Appendix F).
Results: Source Function. Figure 13 displays the
median source function wt . (For comparison, it also
reproduces w of §4.) We used linear interpolation in
the ti scale to fit domains. The source function dis-
plays an inverse-S shape with an intersection with
the diagonal at about 0.3, which is confirmed by the
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values reported in Table 3. The differences between
the W and P are always significant, both by t-
tests and by Wilcoxon tests, rejecting expected util-
ity, except for t2 (which determines T20). The latter is
no surprise because t2 is near the expected intersec-
tion point where overweighting changes into under-
weighting.
Again, we estimated Prelec’s (1998) two-parameter
weighting function (Equation (8)) for every individ-
ual by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. The
median values of * and ) were 0.684 and 1.208,
respectively, whereas the values of * and ) based on
the median data were 0.622 and 1.166. The former
weighting function is depicted in Figure 13 and, obvi-
ously, accommodates the prevailing inverse-S pattern.




w-curve of §4 for risky
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for T -Events
W Mean P Median P Standard deviation P
P T10 1/8 (0.125)∗ 013 008 014
P T20 2/8 (0.25) 031 023 022
P T40 4/8 (0.50)∗∗ 064 069 024
P T60 6/8 (0.75)∗∗ 084 090 016
P T70 7/8 (0.875)∗∗ 092 095 008
Note. Asterisks indicate significant difference with P ; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 0001.
Both * and ) are significantly different between
risk and uncertainty based on Mann-Whitney tests
* z= 4
606, p < 0
001; ) z = 2
358, p = 0
02). Indi-
vidual results are in Online Appendix C, provided in
the e-companion.
Discussion of Results and Ambiguity Attitudes.
The significant differences between the si’s and the ti’s
provide yet another falsification of expected utility.
Relative to measurements under expected utility, the
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) method requires the measure-
ment of one additional curve per source. We empha-
size that wt concerns the attitude toward uncertainty
including ambiguity rather than (merely) attitudes
toward risk.
The difference between wt and w (the probabil-
ity weighting function for risk as measured in §4)
reflects ambiguity. We can only compare between sub-
jects here. Within-subject comparisons can obviously
be obtained by carrying out both measurements of
§§4 and 5 within individuals. For brevity, we have
not carried out such a task here and leave it to
future studies. Under universal ambiguity aversion,
wt would be below w everywhere, but this is clearly
not the case. Instead, wt is more inverse-S shaped
than is w, implying ambiguity aversion for events of
moderate and high likelihood, but ambiguity seeking
for unlikely events.4 It shows that modeling ambigu-
ity attitudes through one single number to reflect a
universal degree of ambiguity aversion is crude and
that degrees of inverse-S shapedness also deserve
attention.
7. A Predictive Exercise for
Uncertainty5
The two practice questions of the experiment for
uncertainty entailed a test of the common consequence
effect. Whereas this important effect has been exten-
sively tested for risk, tests for uncertainty are virtu-
ally absent. We are only aware of MacCrimmon and
4 This phenomenon is in agreement with claims and findings by
Curley and Yates (1989), Tversky and Fox (1995), Abdellaoui et al.
(2005), Kahn and Sarin (1988, p. 270), Kahneman and Tversky
(1979, p. 281), Kilka and Weber (2001), and Weber (1994), and was
predicted by Ellsberg (2001) himself.
5 Adding this section was suggested by two editors.
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Larsson (1979, pp. 364–365), Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), andWu and Gonzalez (1999). Given the current
interest in uncertainty, it is worth investigating this
effect in more detail. After a first qualitative inspection
of the data, we will see to what extent the quantita-
tive estimations of the preceding sections predict the
choices observed.
We denote events L = −12
5 (mean temper-
ature in Eindhoven below 12.5C on September 22,
2008), M = 12
517, and H = 17. Because
all prospects in this section refer to these events,
we suppress them and write x1x2x3 instead of
Lx1MNx2Hx3. Subjects were first asked to
choose between the prospects
S1 = 05050 versus R1 = 00150
and then to choose between the prospects
S2 = 50= 505050 versus R2 = 500150

The only difference between the two choice situations
is that the common outcome 0 under event L in the
first choice pair has been replaced by the common
outcome 50 in the second choice pair. Under expected
utility, choice should not be affected by such a replace-
ment and, hence, only the choice patterns S1S2 and
R1R2 are possible. We observed the following choice
patterns: S1S2: 26.83%; R1R2: 4.88%; S1R2: 24.39%; R1S2:
43.90%. Thus, in the first choice situation, the two




22% chose the safer S1), but
in the second there is a significant majority prefer-





tests in this section are two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests. A significant majority of subjects violate
EU (68.29% chose R1S1 or S1R2; p = 0
02). The viola-
tion R1S2 significantly deviates from 25% p = 0
04
whereas the other violation (S1R2) does not. These
qualitative results all agree with the usual findings
in common consequence tests (mostly done for risk),
confirming the certainty effect. The findings agree
both with pessimistic and with inverse-S weighting
functions (Wakker 2010, §10.4.3).
We next inspect the predictions resulting from the
quantitative estimations of the preceding sections. As
explained in §5, the values of Wt→ observed there
do not suffice to evaluate prospect R2 because the
outcomes of R2 are not always increasing in tem-
perature. Hence, additional measurements of W with
other rankings of events are needed to predict the
choices considered.
The source method of §6 does give complete infor-
mation about W and can be used to predict the
choices considered. To this effect, we used linear inter-
polation on the belief data to obtain the subjective
probabilities PL, PM, and PH. Their means are
Table 4 Predictions for the Four Choice Patterns
Prediction (%)
S1S2 R1R2 S1R2 R1S2
S1S2 N = 11 6364a 1818 0 1818
R1R2 N = 2 50 50 0 0
S1R2 N = 10 40 0 50 10
R1S2 N = 18 3889 556 0 5556




24, and PL= 0
25. Hence, the
mean of PL∪H, for instance, is 0.49. We also used
linear interpolation for the elicited wt-function, with
resulting means wtPH= 0
25, wtPL∪H= 0
40,
and wtPM ∪H= 0
62. We felt that fitting a power
utility function was more appropriate than using
linear interpolation because the stimuli considered
in this section involve outcomes below the interval
where we measured utility, including the outcome 0.
On larger domains, U will deviate more from linear-
ity. We hence fitted power utility at the individual
level, on the basis of the data obtained in the first
part of the experiment, to obtain U (E0), U (E50), and
U (E150) for each subject.6
Table 4 gives the percentages of choice patterns pre-
dicted by the quantitative estimations from the source
method. It does so for the four groups of subjects with
revealed choice patterns.
For each group, our quantitative estimations pre-
dicted correctly in a (weak) majority of cases, con-
siderably exceeding the 25% that would result under
random choice. The percentages reported in Table 4
also suggest that the usual common consequence vio-
lation R1S2 is not only due to noise but also has a
systematic part. The unusual violation S1R2 is mostly
due to noise.
8. Other Measurements in the
Literature
In parametric fittings, parametric families of utility
and weighting functions are assumed beforehand.
The parameters in these families are then chosen so
as to minimize the distance to the data, possibly
through likelihood functions in probabilistic choice
models. In nonparametric measurements, all utility
and weighting functions are possible, and their val-
ues at particular outcomes and probabilities or events
are directly inferred from data. The latter is usually
6 To investigate the predictions about weighting functions without
need to estimate utility, we could have adjusted, say, the highest
outcome 150 of R1 and R2 to obtain R1 ∼ S1 for each individual.
Then the preference between R2 and S2 would immediately cor-
respond with whether W is convex, concave, or additive for the
events considered (Wakker 2010, §7.4), irrespective of utility.
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based on deterministic models. Deviations from the
deterministic models are subsequently detected using
cross-checks and statistical analyses. An intermedi-
ate measurement technique does use data fitting but
does not commit to any parametric family and instead
takes every utility value at every outcome and every
weight of every probability or event as a parame-
ter. This section mainly focuses on nonparametric fit-
tings, whereas the next section discusses their pros
and cons. There have been many parametric fittings
of weighting functions for risk, referenced in Online
Appendix G, provided in the e-companion.
8.1. Nonparametric Measurements of Weighting
Functions for Risk
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Stott (2006) used the
intermediate form of data fitting just explained,
requiring much data per subject but yielding reliable
results in return. Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt
and Pinto (2000) provided two more tractable meth-
ods for eliciting probability weighting functions non-
parametrically. As with all other measurements used
before, but unlike our midweighting method, these
methods need a detailed measurement of utility. From
n observed indifferences we obtain n− 2 data points
of the weighting function (plus 1 data point of utility),
whereas Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto
(2000), for instance, would obtain only (n− 1)/2 data
points of probability weighting (plus (n − 1)/2 data
points of utility).
8.2. Measurements of Weighting Functions for
Uncertainty
We focus on studies that considered more than one
event (and its complement). The only parametric fit-
tings for weighting functions under uncertainty that
we are aware of are in Ahn et al. (2009), Andersen
et al. (2007), and Hey et al. (2010). These works esti-
mated weighting functions jointly with utility func-
tions. Regarding nonparametric measurements, we
are only aware of measurements by Diecidue et al.
(2007) and Kilka and Weber (2001), who assumed
linear utility; Mangelsdorff and Weber (1994), who
assumed expected utility for risk; Abdellaoui et al.
(2005), who adapted the methods of Abdellaoui
(2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) to uncer-
tainty; and, finally, Abdellaoui et al. (2011), Fox et al.
(1996), Fox and Tversky (1998), and Tversky and Fox
(1995), who carried out complex measurements that
included detailed measurements of utility functions.
Our method is more efficient for the purpose of mea-
suring weighting functions because it can do so while
minimizing the need to measure utility. This is useful
for studies that focus on the weighting function, being
the new component of risk and ambiguity beyond
expected utility. For the purpose of actually describ-
ing and predicting decisions, measurements of util-
ity as in the above studies are needed after all. Here
an advantage of our method is that it can minimize
the dependence of weighting function measurements,
and their errors, upon (errors in) utility measure-
ments. There have also been some studies that used
direct judgments of subjective probabilities (Einhorn
and Hogarth 1985, Hogarth and Einhorn 1990, Wu
and Gonzalez 1999), based on introspection and not
on revealed preference. This paper has focused on
revealed-preference based methods.
8.3. Measuring Endogenous Midpoints
We used Wakker and Deneffe’s (1996) tradeoff
measurement technique to obtain utility midpoints
derived endogenously from preference. Abdellaoui
et al. (2007); Fishburn and Edwards (1997, Axiom 8);
Harvey (1986, tradeoffs midvalues above Equa-
tion (4)); and Köbberling and Wakker (2003, p. 408)
similarly used this method. Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
next obtained a probability q with wq= 0
5 through
what amounts to a degenerate version of Figure 1
with c = 1 and a = 0. Finally, they used this prob-
ability to efficiently measure utility midpoints in
general. Their approach can, like our approach, be
interpreted as a special case of Blavatskyy’s (2006)
general procedure. Abdellaoui (2002), Abdellaoui and
Munier (1999), Abdellaoui and Wakker (2005), and
Wu et al. (2005) used a tradeoff method in the proba-
bility dimension, dual to Wakker and Deneffe’s (1996)
tradeoff method in the outcome dimension, to mea-
sure equalities of probability weighting differences,
independent of utility. This can, in particular, be used
to measure probability weighting midpoints but is
less flexible than our method.
Vind (1991, p. 134; 2003, §IV.2, above Theo-
rem IV.2.1) proposed an alternative method for ob-
taining endogenous utility midpoints under expected
utility and, more generally, under state-dependent
expected utility (from which he derived what he
called a mean groupoid operation). He showed that y
is the utility midpoint between x and z if the follow-
ing indifferences hold:
x∼ x1qx2 z∼ z1qz2 and x1qz2 ∼ z1qx2 ∼ y
 (12)
His method holds under prospect theory if we add
the requirement that x1 > x2, x1 > z2, z1 > z2, and
z1 > x2, assuming only gains.
Ghirardato et al. (2003, Definition 4) proposed
another method to derive utility midpoints endoge-
nously from preferences. They showed that ) is the
utility midpoint between * and 5 under prospect
theory if the following indifferences hold:
*q5 ∼ xqy x∼ *q) and y ∼ )q5 (13)
with *>)> 5.
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With ) a utility midpoint between * and 5, the
tradeoff method has 5 as dependent variable and
* and ) as independent variables, whereas the other
two methods have ) as dependent variable and
* and 5 as independent variables. In the former case,
the experimenter has no control over the range *5,
which is a drawback of the tradeoff method. We still
preferred this method because it requires fewer indif-
ferences to be measured and is easier to implement
experimentally.
9. General Discussion
9.1. Inverse-S and Convex Weighting Functions
Empirical studies have found that individual weight-
ing functions are mostly convex or inverse-S shaped,
with the latter shape prevailing. Thus, the majority
of studies found that a majority of weighting func-
tions exhibited the inverse-S shape. We are aware of
some 50 such references (Online Appendix G). Yet
the finding is not universal; several studies not only
found convex weighting functions for some of their
subjects but also even for a majority, as we did for
risk.7 Several other studies found other empirical evi-
dence against inverse-S.8
Thus, although we believe that inverse-S is the
prevailing phenomenon, it is certainly not univer-
sal. It is not clear at this stage why different stud-
ies have conflicting results. Much about weighting
functions remains yet to be discovered. Our find-
ings and literature search suggest once more that
probability weighting, more than utility, is a volatile
phenomenon, with results depending on framing and
ways of measurement and with no phenomena hold-
ing in great generality. As a first, admittedly after-
the-fact, explanation, our method may have sup-
pressed inverse-S somewhat because it keeps out-
comes fixed and focuses on uncertainty, enhancing
sensitivity toward uncertainty. Inverse-S entails insen-
sitivity toward uncertainty. For risk, this enhancing of
sensitivity may have been strong enough to suppress
the inverse-S shape. Because inverse-S is more pro-
nounced for unknown probabilities, it may still have
shown up for those. The effect discussed here could
be reduced by not sequencing all questions for finding
one indifference successively but interspersing them
with other questions (Abdellaoui 2000, p. 1504). Our
7 See Goeree et al. (2002), Jullien and Salanié (2000), Kühberger et al.
(1999, p. 217), Li et al. (2009), Mosteller and Nogee (1951, in their
student population), and Qiu and Steiger (2011).
8 See Barron and Erev (2003), Bearden et al. (2007); Birnbaum (2008,
in particular pp. 484–486, and the many references to his preced-
ing studies), Bleichrodt (2001), Fatas et al. (2007), Goeree et al.
(2003), Hartinger (1999), Henrich and Mcelreat (2002), Humphrey
and Verschoor (2004), Kunreuther and Pauly (2003), Loomes (1991),
Loomes et al. (2002), Luce (1996), and Stott (2006).
restriction to prospects at the boundary of the proba-
bility triangle may also have contributed to the extra
observed pessimism.
As a second after-the-fact explanation, statistical
regression to the mean may have enhanced inverse-S
shapes in many studies. For example, in a direct
measurement of the decision weight assigned to
probability 0.1 under expected utility with noise,
underestimation due to error can never be more
than 0.1, but overestimation can be as much as 0.9.
Average measurements of decision weights can then
exceed 0.1 merely because of this error structure. The
extent to which different measurements are suscep-
tible to regression to the mean is a topic for future
research. In our measurements of midpoints, there
is always as much space for overestimation as for
underestimation. Thus, the absence of regression to
the mean in our design may further explain why we
find fewer inverse-S shapes.
9.2. Parametric and Nonparametric Measurements
Advantages of parametric measurement techniques
are that these can be applied to virtually any data set
and that they smooth errors in the data. A drawback
is that they require prior commitment to particular
parametric families. These impose particular shapes
of the weighting function that may not hold in reality
and give no insights into the prevalence of alterna-
tive shapes. Some examples are Hey and Orme (1994)
and Harless and Camerer (1994), who used power
functions, excluding inverse-S shapes, and Donkers
et al. (2001), who committed to inverse-S shapes,
excluding other shapes. Often their findings crucially
depend on the parametric family chosen (Blavatskyy
and Pogrebna 2011; Harrison 2006, p. 61; Loomes et al.
2002). Another drawback is that these methods are
often subject to colinearity effects, where utility and
the weighting functions have similar effects and can-
not be reliably separated, with errors in one generat-
ing errors in the other (Stott 2006, pp. 112, 121).
An obvious advantage of nonparametric measure-
ments is that they need no prior commitment to any
shape and that they will uncover true patterns and
phenomena irrespective of what those are. They also
make clear to what extent utility and weighting func-
tions concern different phenomena, explaining differ-
ent parts of the variance in data, and to what extent
they overlap. Furthermore, they show how probabil-
ity weighting and utility are related to decisions in a
transparent manner. Hence they can be used in inter-
active measurement sessions, as common in prescrip-
tive applications.
9.3. The Richness of Ambiguity
To date, most studies of ambiguity have only mea-
sured a single number for one event per person,
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intended to measure a universal aversion toward
ambiguity of that person. Abdellaoui et al. (2011)
showed that the more general source functions can
capture the richness of ambiguity and uncertainty
attitudes in a tractable manner. We have shown how
source functions can be measured more efficiently
using the midweight method. Our experiments con-
firm the Abdellaoui et al. (2011) finding that peo-
ple are ambiguity averse for events of moderate and
high likelihood but are, on the contrary, ambiguity
seeking for unlikely events. This pattern of ambigu-
ity attitudes was suggested before by Ellsberg (2001,
pp. 203, 206).
9.4. Chaining
The values x1, x2, and w−1p that were elicited from
subjects returned as inputs in later questions (chain-
ing). Bisection also involves chaining. It is well known
that subjects can exploit chaining by not answering at
particular questions truthfully so as to improve stim-
uli in future questions. Such a distortion is unlikely
to have arisen in our experiment. It is difficult for
subjects to notice that their answer to one question
will influence future stimuli. For example, we did
not directly ask for the indifference values used in
future questions but derived indifference values indi-
rectly as midpoints between values used in choices,
so that subjects had not seen the indifference val-
ues before and in this way could not recognize them.
In addition, to exploit chaining, subjects must under-
stand the presence of chaining and also how future
questions will depend on current answers, which
is very hard for subjects. Finally, our strategy-check
questions revealed no strategic exploitation of chain-
ing. We carefully formulated our instructions (end of
Appendix B) in order to avoid deception.
Another complication of chained questions is that
they generate error propagation. Blavatskyy (2006)
described the general procedure of starting with mea-
surements in one dimension, then using these to
obtain measurements in the other dimension, possibly
using the latter again to obtain more refined measure-
ments in the first dimension, and so on. He examined
general efficiency principles regarding error propaga-
tion of such general procedures.
To investigate the effects of error propagation, we
performed a simulation study similar to Bleichrodt
and Pinto (2000). We assumed that true utility dif-
ferences were multiplied by an error factor 1 + e,
with e normally distributed with mean zero and stan-
dard deviation 0.05. We assumed the same propor-
tional error in w−1. We further assumed prospect
theory with power utility Ux = x0
88 and weight-
ing function wp= e−0
93− ln p0
85 (found by Abdellaoui
et al. 2011, Figure 3). We performed 1,000 simula-
tions and found that propagation of error is not a
big problem. For each probability w−1j/8 measured,
the standard deviation was less than 0.05, the selected
size of the response errors. Other simulation stud-
ies of error propagation in setups similar to ours
were reported by Abdellaoui et al. (2005, p. 1394),
Bleichrodt et al. (2010, p. 164), and Bleichrodt and
Pinto (2000, p. 1495). These studies also found that
the effects of error propagation are small.
In the experiment we used the midweight method
to measure the weighting function over its whole
domain. The method can also be used to investigate
the local curvature of the weighting function. For
example, if we want to know whether the weight-
ing function is convex on a particular domain a c,
then we can use our method to find the w-midpoint q
between a and c, then the w-midpoint between a and
q, and so on. In this manner we obtain local tests of
convexity on a c.
10. Conclusion
We have introduced a new method for measuring
functions that weigh risk and uncertainty. It is almost
twice as efficient as methods that have been used
before because it minimizes the required measure-
ments of utility. Experiments have demonstrated the
feasibility of our method for both risk and uncertainty.
Our method serves well to study ambiguity because
it can be used for risk and uncertainty in the same
way, resulting in good measurements of ambiguity
(the difference between uncertainty and risk). We can
now study deviations from expected utility, including
ambiguity attitudes, while almost entirely skipping
the measurement of utility.
11. Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as
part of the online version that can be found at http://
mansci.journal.informs.org/.
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Appendix A. Bisection to Measure Indifference
The bisection method to find g to generate an indifference
(ax2, dx1, cx0 ∼ x2g+ax0 as in Figure 1 proceeded as fol-
lows. We iteratively narrowed down so-called indifference
intervals containing g+ a, as follows. The first indifference
interval b1u1 was ad + a, i.e., the interval of which
the weighting-midpoint was to be found.9 By stochastic
9 The first indifference interval is, thus, 01 for w−14/8,
0w−14/8 for w−12/8, w−14/81 for w−16/8, 0w−12/8
for w−11/8, and w−16/81 for w−17/8.
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dominance, it indeed contains g + a. Each subject was first
asked to make two practice choices between a particular
prospect L and prospect R= x2g++ax0 (or =x2g−+ax0, where
probability g++a g−+awas set equal to the upper (lower)
limit of the range of the first indifference interval of prob-
ability g+ a minus (plus) 1/100. Then the iterative process
started.
To construct the j + 1th indifference interval bj+1uj+1
from the jth indifference interval [bj , uj ), we elicited
whether the midpoint of bj uj  was larger or smaller
than a + g. To do so, we observed the choice between
(ax2dx1 cx0) and x2 bj+uj /2x0. A right choice meant that
the midpoint was larger than g + a so that g + a was
contained in bj  bj + uj/2, which was then defined as
the j + 1th indifference interval bj+1uj+1. A left choice
meant that the midpoint was smaller than g + a so that
g + a was contained in bj + uj/2uj , which was then
defined as the j + 1th indifference interval bj+1uj+1. We
did five iteration steps like this, ending up with b6u6,
and took its midpoint as the elicited indifference probabil-
ity a+ g.10
10 Because prospects yielded prizes depending on the result of a
roll with two 10-sided dice, we only allowed values j/100 for prob-
abilities. When a particular midpoint probability was not a value
j/100, the computer took the closest value j/100 on the left of this
value if the value was lower than half and on the right of this
value if the value was higher than half. The order of elicitation was
varied among subjects to reduce potential order effects. The order
of elicitation was w−14/8, w−12/8, w−16/8, w−11/8, w−17/8
As an illustration, Figure A.1 replicates the bisection pro-
cedure followed to obtain the probability corresponding
to the weight of 0.5. The particular pattern of answers
depicted there, preferring the right prospect twice and the
left prospect three times, was exhibited by six of our sub-
jects. After the fifth iteration step, the midpoint of the
last indifference interval was taken as the final indifference
probability. Thus, individual indifference between the cer-
tain prospect x1 and the prospect x20
615x0 was inferred
from the choices made by the six subjects whose choices are
replicated in Figure A.1.
Appendix B. Experimental Instructions
[Instructions have been translated from Dutch into English.]
Welcome to this experiment. If you have a question while
reading these instructions, please raise your hand. The
experimenter will then come to your table to answer your
question. This experiment will take about half an hour. We
would like you to make a number of decisions during this
experiment. Each time, you choose between what we call
“prospects.” Both prospects yield prizes depending on the
roll of the two 10-sided dice similar to the ones that are on
your table right now.
As you can see, one 10-sided die has the values 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, and the other has the values 00, 10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90. If we code the sum of the
for some subjects, whereas for the others it was w−14/8, w−16/8,
w−12/8, w−17/8, w−11/8.
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roll “a 0 and a 00” as 100, then the sum of a roll with both
10-sided dice yields a random number from 1 up to 100.
The prospects from which you have to choose are called
prospect L (left) and prospect R (right) and are presented in
the following way:
Prospect L Prospect R
Roll Probability Prize Roll Probability Prize
1 to 40 40% E100 1 to 20 20% E150
41 to 100 60% E50 21 to 100 80% E20
In the case depicted here, prospect L yields a prize of E100
if the sum of the roll with both 10-sided dice is 1 up to 40
and E50 if the sum of the roll is 41 up to 100. Similarly,
prospect R yields a prize of E150 if the sum of a roll with
both 10-sided dice is 1 up to 20, and prospect R yields a
prize of E20 otherwise.
Both the prizes as well as the probabilities of yielding
certain prizes can vary across decisions. We would like you
to choose between prospect L and prospect R each time by
clicking the corresponding button with the mouse.
You will receive E5 for your participation in this experi-
ment. In addition, at the end of this experiment one subject
will be selected at random, as follows. Each subject will ran-
domly select a sealed envelope containing either a white or
a blue card. Those with a white card receive E5 for their
participation. For the subject with a blue card, one of the
decisions will be randomly selected by rolling both 10-sided
dice. Thereafter, the prize of the chosen prospect in the deci-
sion selected will be determined by rolling the two 10-sided
dice again. The resulting prize, always more than E5, will
be paid to the subject with the blue card.
There are no right or wrong answers in this experiment.
The experiment exclusively concerns your own preferences.
Those are what we are interested in. At every decision it
is best for you, if it will be played for real, that you have
chosen the prospect that you want most. If you select the
envelope containing the blue card at the end of the exper-
iment, the aforementioned decision may be selected at the
end of the experiment. Then, the chosen prospect will be
played out. Of course, you want that prospect to be your
preferred prospect. If you have no further questions then
you can now start with the experiment by clicking on the
“Continue” button below.
References
Abdellaoui, M. 2000. Parameter-free elicitation of utility and prob-
ability weighting functions. Management Sci. 46 1497–1512.
Abdellaoui, M. 2002. A genuine rank-dependent generalization
of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem.
Econometrica 70 717–736.
Abdellaoui, M., B. R. Munier. 1999. How consistent are proba-
bility tradeoffs in individual preferences under risk? M. J.
Machina, B. R. Munier, eds. Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in
Decision-Making. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands, 285–295.
Abdellaoui, M., P. P. Wakker. 2005. The likelihood method for deci-
sion under uncertainty. Theory Decision 58 3–76.
Abdellaoui, M., F. Vossmann, M. Weber. 2005. Choice-based elic-
itation and decomposition of decision weights for gains and
losses under uncertainty. Management Sci. 51 1384–1399.
Abdellaoui, M., H. Bleichrodt, C. Paraschiv. 2007. Loss aversion
under prospect theory: A parameter-free measurement. Man-
agement Sci. 53 1659–1674.
Abdellaoui, M., A. Baillon, L. Placido, P. P. Wakker. 2011. The rich
domain of uncertainty: Source functions and their experimen-
tal implementation. Amer. Econom. Rev. Forthcoming.
Ahn, D. S., S. Choi, D. Gale, S. Kariv. 2009. Estimating ambi-
guity aversion in a portfolio choice experiment. Working
paper, Department of Economics, University of California,
Los Angeles, Los Angeles.
Allais, M. 1953. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le
risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l’ecole Américaine.
Econometrica 21 503–546.
Andersen, S., G. W. Harrison, J. Fountain, E. E. Rutström. 2007.
Elicitating beliefs: Theory and experiments. Working paper,
Department of Economics, University of Central Florida,
Orlando.
Armantier, O. 2006. Do wealth differences affect fairness consider-
ations. Internat. Econom. Rev. 47 391–429.
Baltussen, G., T. Post, M. J. van den Assem, P. P. Wakker. 2010.
Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment.
Working paper, Department of Economics, Erasmus University,
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Bardsley, N., P. G. Moffat. 2009. A meta-analysis of the preference
reversal phenomenon. In preparation, School of Economics,
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
Barron, G., I. Erev. 2003. Small feedback-based decisions and their
limited correspondence to description-based decisions. J. Behav.
Decision Making 16 215–233.
Bearden, J. N., T. S. Wallsten, C. R. Fox. 2007. Contrasting stochastic
and support theory accounts of subadditivity. J. Math. Psych.
51 229–241.
Birnbaum, M. H. 2008. Evaluation of the priority heuristic as
a descriptive model of risky decision making: Comment on
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Psych. Rev. 115
253–260.
Blavatskyy, P. R. 2006. Error propagation in the elicitation of util-
ity and probability weighting functions. Theory Decision 60
315–334.
Blavatskyy, P., G. Pogrebna. 2011. Models of stochastic choice and
decision theory: Why both are important for analyzing deci-
sions. J. Appl. Econometrics. Forthcoming.
Bleichrodt, H. 2001. Probability weighting in choice under risk: An
empirical test. J. Risk Uncertainty 23 185–198.
Bleichrodt, H., J. L. Pinto. 2000. A parameter-free elicitation of the
probability weighting function in medical decision analysis.
Management Sci. 46 1485–1496.
Bleichrodt, H., A. Cillo, E. Diecidue. 2010. A quantitative measure-
ment of regret theory. Management Sci. 56 161–175.
Bostic, R., R. J. Herrnstein, R. D. Luce. 1990. The effect on the
preference-reversal phenomenon of using choice indifferences.
J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 13 193–212.
Curley, S. P., J. F. Yates. 1989. An empirical evaluation of descrip-
tive models of ambiguity reactions in choice situations. J. Math.
Psych. 33 397–427.
Diecidue, E., P. P. Wakker, M. Zeelenberg. 2007. Eliciting deci-
sion weights by adapting de Finetti’s betting-odds method to
prospect theory. J. Risk Uncertainty 34 179–199.
Donkers, A. C. D., B. Melenberg, A. H. O. van Soest. 2001. Esti-
mating risk attitudes using lotteries: A large sample approach.
J. Risk Uncertainty 22 165–195.
Einhorn, H. J., R. M. Hogarth. 1985. Ambiguity and uncertainty in
probabilistic inference. Psych. Rev. 92 433–461.
Ellsberg, D. 1961. Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms. Quart. J.
Econom. 75 643–669.
Ellsberg, D. 2001. Risk, Ambiguity and Decision. Garland Publishers,
New York. Original Ph.D. dissertation: Ellsberg, D. 1962. Risk,
ambiguity and decision. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Epstein, L. G., J. Zhang. 2001. Subjective probabilities on subjec-
tively unambiguous events. Econometrica 69 265–306.
van de Kuilen and Wakker: The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes Toward Risk and Ambiguity
598 Management Science 57(3), pp. 582–598, © 2011 INFORMS
Fatas, E., T. Neugebauer, P. Tamborero. 2007. How politicians make
decisions: A political choice experiment. J. Econom. 92 167–196.
Fishburn, P. C., W. Edwards. 1997. Discount-neutral utility models
for denumerable time streams. Theory Decision 43 139–166.
Fox, C. R., A. Tversky. 1998. A belief-based account of decision
under uncertainty. Management Sci. 44 879–895.
Fox, C. R., B. A. Rogers, A. Tversky. 1996. Options traders exhibit
subadditive decision weights. J. Risk Uncertainty 13 5–17.
Ghirardato, P., F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, M. Siniscalchi.
2003. A subjective spin on roulette wheels. Econometrica 71
1897–1908.
Gilboa, I. 1987. Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive
probabilities. J. Math. Econom. 16 65–88.
Gilboa, I., D. Schmeidler. 1989. Maxmin expected utility with a non-
unique prior. J. Math. Econom. 18 141–153.
Goeree, J. K., C. A. Holt, T. R. Palfrey. 2002. Quantal response equi-
librium and overbidding in private-value auctions. J. Econom.
Theory 104 247–272.
Goeree, J. K., C. A. Holt, T. R. Palfrey. 2003. Risk averse behavior
in generalized matching pennies games. Games Econom. Behav.
45 97–113.
Gonzalez, R., G. Wu. 1999. On the shape of the probability weight-
ing function. Cognitive Psych. 38 129–166.
Grabisch, M., I. Kojadinovic, P. Meyer. 2008. A review of meth-
ods for capacity identification in Choquet integral based
multi-attribute utility theory: Applications of the Kappalab R
package. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 186 766–785.
Greenspan, A. 2004. Innovations and issues in monetary policy: The
last fifteen years. Amer. Econom. Rev., Papers Proc. 94 33–40.
Harless, D. W., C. F. Camerer. 1994. The predictive utility of gener-
alized expected utility theories. Econometrica 62 1251–1289.
Harrison, G. W. 1986. An experimental test for risk aversion.
Econom. Lett. 21 7–11.
Harrison, G. W. 2006. Hypothetical bias over uncertain outcomes.
J. A. List, ed. Using Experimental Methods in Environmental and
Resource Economics. Elgar, Northampton, UK, 41–69.
Harrison, G. W., M. I. Lau, E. E. Rutström. 2007. Estimating risk atti-
tudes in Denmark: A field experiment. Scandinavian J. Econom.
109 341–368.
Hartinger, A. 1999. Do generalized expected utility theories cap-
ture persisting properties of individual decision makers? Acta
Psych. 102 21–42.
Harvey, C. M. 1986. Value functions for infinite-period planning.
Management Sci. 32 1123–1139.
Henrich, J., R. Mcelreat. 2002. Are peasants risk-averse decision
makers? Current Anthropology 43 172–181.
Hey, J. D., C. Orme. 1994. Investigating generalizations of
expected utility theory using experimental data. Econometrica
62 1291–1326.
Hey, J. D., G. Lotito, A. Maffioletti. 2010. The descriptive and pre-
dictive adequacy of theories of decision making under uncer-
tainty/ambiguity. J. Risk Uncertainty 41 81–111.
Hogarth, R. M., H. J. Einhorn. 1990. Venture theory: A model of
decision weights. Management Sci. 36 780–803.
Humphrey, S. J., A. Verschoor. 2004. The probability weight-
ing function: Experimental evidence from Uganda, India and
Ethiopia. Econom. Lett. 84 419–425.
Jullien, B., B. Salanié. 2000. Estimating preferences under risk: The
case of racetrack bettors. J. Political Econom. 108 503–530.
Kahn, B. E., R. K. Sarin. 1988. Modeling ambiguity in decisions
under uncertainty. J. Consumer Res. 15 265–272.
Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica 47 263–291.
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability. McMillan, London.
Kilka, M., M. Weber. 2001. What determines the shape of the prob-
ability weighting function under uncertainty? Management Sci.
47 1712–1726.
Knight, F. H. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Houghton Mifflin,
New York.
Köbberling, V., P. P. Wakker. 2003. Preference foundations for non-
expected utility: A generalized and simplified technique.Math.
Oper. Res. 28 395–423.
Kühberger, A., M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, J. Perner. 1999. The effects
of framing, reflection, probability, and payoff on risk prefer-
ence in choice tasks. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 78
204–231.
Kunreuther, H. C., M. Pauly. 2003. Neglecting disaster: Why don’t
people insure against large losses? J. Risk Uncertainty 28 5–21.
Li, L.-B., S.-H. He, S. Li, J.-H. Xu, L.-L. Rao. 2009. A closer look at
the Russian roulette problem: A re-examination of the nonlin-
earity of the prospect theory’s decision weight . Internat. J.
Approximate Reasoning 50 515–520.
Loomes, G. 1991. Evidence of a new violation of the independence
axiom. J. Risk Uncertainty 4 92–109.
Loomes, G., P. G. Moffat, R. Sugden. 2002. A microeconometric test
of alternative stochastic theories of risky choice. J. Risk Uncer-
tainty 24 103–130.
Luce, R. D. 1996. When four distinct ways to measure utility are
the same. J. Math. Psych. 40 297–317.
MacCrimmon, K. R., S. Larsson. 1979. Utility theory: Axioms versus
“paradoxes.” M. Allais, O. Hagen, eds. Expected Utility Hypothe-
ses and the Allais Paradox. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands,
333–409.
Mangelsdorff, L., M. Weber. 1994. Testing Choquet expected utility.
J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 25 437–457.
Mosteller, F., P. Nogee. 1951. An experimental measurement of util-
ity. J. Political Econom. 59 371–404.
Noussair, C., S. Robbin, B. Ruffieux. 2004. Revealing consumers’
willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and
the Vickrey auction. J. Econom. Psych. 25 725–741.
Prelec, D. 1998. The probability weighting function. Econometrica 66
497–527.
Qiu, J., E.-M. Steiger. 2011. Understanding the two components of
risk attitudes: An experimental analysis. Management Sci. 57
193–199.
Quiggin, J. 1981. Risk perception and risk aversion among Aus-
tralian farmers. Australian J. Agricultural Econom. 25 160–169.
Rabin, M. 2000. Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A cali-
bration theorem. Econometrica 68 1281–1292.
Savage, L. J. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York.
Schmeidler, D. 1989. Subjective probability and expected utility
without additivity. Econometrica 57 571–587.
Stott, H. P. 2006. Cumulative prospect theory’s functional
menagerie. J. Risk Uncertainty 32 101–130.
Tversky, A., C. R. Fox. 1995. Weighing risk and uncertainty. Psych.
Rev. 102 269–283.
Tversky, A., D. Kahneman. 1992 Advances in prospect theory:
Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertainty
5 297–323.
Vind, K. 1991. Independent preferences. J. Math. Econom. 20
119–135.
Vind, K. 2003. Independence, Additivity, Uncertainty. With contribu-
tions by B. Grodal. Springer, Berlin.
Wakker, P. P. 2008. Uncertainty. L. Blume, S. N. Durlauf, eds.
The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. MacMillan Press,
London, 6780–6791.
Wakker, P. P. 2010. Prospect Theory for Risk and Ambiguity. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Wakker, P. P., D. Deneffe. 1996. Eliciting von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities when probabilities are distorted or un-
known. Management Sci. 42 1131–1150.
Weber, E. U. 1994. From subjective probabilities to decision weights:
The effects of asymmetric loss functions on the evaluation of
uncertain outcomes and events. Psych. Bull. 115 228–242.
Wu, G., R. Gonzalez. 1999. Nonlinear decision weights in choice
under uncertainty. Management Sci. 45 74–85.
Wu, G., J. Zhang, M. Abdellaoui. 2005. Testing prospect theories
using probability tradeoff consistency. J. Risk Uncertainty 30
107–131.
